A long-standing institutional bribery network within the passport offices has been highlighted through investigative accounts, revealing an organised system involving brokers, officials at multiple levels, and designated intermediary staff referred to as “channel masters”. Allegations suggest that this system processes and distributes large sums of illicit payments every month, with involvement extending across administrative tiers.
According to statements obtained by the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) during questioning of a passport department official, the bribery mechanism is deeply embedded within operational structures. The official reportedly described the system as difficult to dismantle due to the involvement of certain senior officials. He further stated that corrupt officials within the Ministry of Home Affairs, field-level members of intelligence agencies, and local representatives of the ruling political party are also alleged beneficiaries of the illicit funds.
The scale of unofficial payments is linked directly to application volume. Approximately 80 per cent of passport applications are processed through broker-mediated channels. These applications incur additional charges beyond government fees, typically ranging between BDT 1,500 and BDT 3,000 per application.
A key operational role within this system is reportedly that of the “channel master”, a designated employee responsible for recording broker-submitted applications, collecting illicit payments, and coordinating distribution. This position is usually held by individuals in accounting or Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) roles.
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Passport Office Classification System
The Passport Department operates around 69 offices nationwide, categorised based on daily application volumes:
| Category | Daily Applications | Description |
|---|---|---|
| A | 200–250 | High-volume, high bribery exposure offices |
| B | Below 200 | Medium-volume offices |
| C | Below 100 | Low-volume offices |
Out of these, 33 offices fall under Category A, 24 under Category B, and 12 under Category C. Sources indicate that Category A offices are considered the most lucrative in terms of unofficial earnings, and postings to such offices are reportedly associated with significant informal payments.
Estimated Monthly Illicit Flow
Based on reported calculations, offices processing around 100 applications daily may generate significant unofficial revenue through broker channels. With 80 per cent of applications routed through brokers and a minimum charge of BDT 1,500 per application, estimated daily illicit collections may reach approximately BDT 120,000. Over five working days, this amounts to around BDT 600,000, and monthly estimates reach approximately BDT 2.4 million, excluding additional charges for corrections and expedited services.
In larger offices handling 1,000 to 1,500 applications daily, weekly unofficial collections are reported to exceed BDT 4 million, with monthly figures reaching up to BDT 15 million.
Headquarters-Level Collection Allegations
Reports also describe a parallel system operating at the central office in Agargaon, Dhaka, where cash-filled packets are allegedly delivered on scheduled dates each month. These are reportedly distributed discreetly to senior officials, including directors and deputy directors.
A passport official, speaking anonymously, described a chain-based distribution system in which funds collected at field offices are transferred to headquarters either in person or through discreet delivery arrangements. In some cases, payments are allegedly delivered directly to officials’ residences.
The same source further stated that portions of the collected funds are distributed among certain local political figures, some members of law enforcement agencies, and individuals posing as journalists associated with nominal publications.
Allegations of Systemic Corruption and Prior Investigations
Officials and sources familiar with the system claim that bribery exists across at least ten service-related categories, including application submission, data correction, and expedited processing. Fee structures vary depending on the complexity of the service required.
Previous investigations, including a reported operation conducted by the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) in 2019, led to questioning of senior officials and the collection of recorded testimonies. A subsequent report containing names of 25 allegedly corrupt officials was forwarded to the Anti-Corruption Commission. Some cases resulted in legal action, while others reportedly stalled due to political influence.
According to ACC officials involved in the investigation, several accused individuals later received clearance through administrative interventions, while others allegedly resumed duties in similar operational environments.
One example cited by a passport official refers to Deputy Director Bipul Kumar Goswami, listed among the officials named in the 2019 DGFI-related report. He was later posted to Chandgaon in Chattogram, an office described in sources as a significant centre within the passport service network.
Administrative Response and Current Situation
Attempts to obtain official comments from senior management, including the Director General of the Passport Department, were unsuccessful. A number of calls and messages reportedly went unanswered.
An unnamed senior official stated that while some reduction in visible brokerage activity has occurred in certain regional offices, strict enforcement has in some cases increased service delays. Critics within the system argue that addressing posting-related irregularities is essential to curbing the broader issue.