Proxy Warfare Networks Fuel Deeper Instability Across Middle East

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio concluded a brief tour of the Middle East on Friday, attempting to project an optimistic tone regarding his high-level discussions with Gulf leaders. However, underlying anxieties persist among regional partners who fear that the current Washington-Tehran diplomatic understandings fail to curb Iran’s regional expansionism.

Acknowledging these explicit concerns, Rubio emphasised that any comprehensive final agreement must require Tehran to restrict more than its nuclear capabilities. The US administration demands that Iran completely halt its financial and military backing of Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, armed factions in Iraq, and the Houthi movement in Yemen.

Iran Rebuilds Damaged Shifting Alliances

Western security officials and military analysts suggest that rather than scaling back, Tehran is poised to increase its reliance on these irregular forces. Despite suffering severe infrastructure and leadership losses during protracted conflicts with Israel throughout 2024 and 2025, Hezbollah remains the central pillar of Iran’s regional “Axis of Resistance”.

Hezbollah failed in its primary strategic objective—acting as a deterrent against direct conventional strikes on Iranian soil. Even so, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which authorised and fostered the group’s creation in Lebanon over 40 years ago, considers its preservation non-negotiable. Hanin Ghaddar, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, noted that Tehran views recent setbacks as temporary. The IRGC considers the re-establishment of its proxy command structure crucial to maintaining its long-term leverage over Washington and Tel Aviv.

Concurrently, Yemen’s Houthis have demonstrated an independent streak. Though their late entry into recent hostilities caused limited structural damage to Israel, their ability to disrupt international shipping lanes in the Red Sea remains intact. Ghaddar observed that whilst the Houthis are ideologically aligned and highly effective during active conflicts, Tehran does not directly control their domestic decision-making centre.

In Iraq, Iranian-backed Shia milita groups have adopted a more calculated approach. These factions claimed responsibility for dozens of rocket and drone strikes targeting Kuwait and US assets in the region, yet they intentionally withheld their full conventional arsenal. Fatal retaliatory airstrikes by the US and the delicate internal politics of Baghdad have made Iraqi leaders highly cautious of triggering an uncontrollable escalation. Michael Knights, an Iraqi militia expert at Horizon Engage, indicated that despite Tehran’s expectations, these groups are unwilling to risk their own domestic political survival.

Failed Western Counters and Changing Regional Dynamics

The reliance on irregular forces is not unique to Tehran. Western intelligence sources reveal that Israel and the US attempted to destabilise Iran from within by mobilizing ethnic minority insurgent groups during the height of hostilities in January. Efforts were made to establish contact with Arab dissidents in the south-west and Baloch separatists in the south-east, though former intelligence officer Michael Milshtein confirmed these early overtones failed to materialise into actual resistance.

A separate, highly classified 20-year-old contingency plan aimed to utilise Kurdish fighters in northern Iraq to destabilise north-western Iran under the protection of allied air superiority. Former military officials revealed the plan intended to split Iranian border defences and trigger wider domestic rebellions. However, the operation collapsed before implementation due to political mistrust and inadequate preparation. Kurdish commanders remained deeply sceptical of Washington’s long-term commitment, particularly following recent shifting policies in Syria that saw Kurdish administrative areas transferred back to central government control. A swift personal intervention by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ultimately forced the White House to abandon the operation entirely.

Parallel to these shifts, Israeli intelligence has financed and armed a newly emerged Druze militia council in Syria. Whilst officially framed as a humanitarian measure to protect vulnerable religious minorities, regional experts suggest the force functions as a geopolitical buffer designed to prevent the central Syrian government from consolidating power near the Israeli border.

In Gaza, Israel’s attempts to establish anti-Hamas Palestinian militias within the 60 per cent of territory under military occupation have yielded poor results. These auxiliary forces have failed to garner public legitimacy or provide an organised alternative to Hamas administration. Milshtein concluded that despite international rhetoric championing demilitarisation, the temptation for global powers to utilise deniable proxy forces remains a primary driver of instability, mirroring ongoing conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Sudan.